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Abstract:  
We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting with matching between firms and 
managers with state-contingent reservation utility. We show that the optimal contract is 
designed to retain and insure the manager. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in 
executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. 
This contract can be implemented with call options based on a single performance 
measure which generally does not filter out luck. When costs of involuntary managerial 
turnover differ across firms, and the abilities of different managers are more or less 
precisely estimated ex-ante, the model can also explain the observed association 
between pay-for-luck and bad corporate governance. 
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In recent years, CEO pay has attracted considerable attention, both in the popular press and
in academic journals. This renewed interest was in part triggered by some puzzling observations
such as pay-for-luck, i.e., the evidence that exogenous and contractible shocks to performance do
nevertheless have an effect on CEO pay (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)). In response to this
and other empirical findings which are inconsistent with a standard version of the principal-agent
model, the managerial power or “skimming” hypothesis has been proposed as an alternative
paradigm, most notably by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
This strand of literature has documented a number of “anomalies”, which are suggestive of
corporate governance failures. Since then, many papers have shown that some of these apparent
“anomalies” can actually be explained in an efficient contracting framework (see the literature
review of Edmans and Gabaix (2009)), although some puzzles remain (Frydman and Jenter
(2010)).
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) acknowledge that the principal-agent model may explain
pay-for-luck, as in Oyer (2004). However, they argue that the facts that pay-for-luck is asym-
metric, in the sense that CEOs tend to be more rewarded for good luck than they are penalized
for bad luck (see also Garvey and Milbourn (2006)), and that pay-for-luck is stronger in firms
with worse corporate governance provide supporting evidence for a skimming model of execu-
tive pay. In this paper, we explain these phenomena as the equilibrium outcome of a simple
principal-agent model of efficient contracting.
As in Oyer (2004), we focus on the effect of a CEO’s outside options on his compensation.
Our baseline model builds on Harris and Holmstrom (1982). We consider a two-period principal-
agent relationship between risk-neutral shareholders and a risk averse CEO with state-contingent
reservation utility. Crucially, as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), we assume that the firm can
commit to employ the CEO next period, but the CEO cannot commit to work for the firm next
period. In this setting, we show that a risk averse CEO accepts a lower pay in the first period
in exchange for insurance against a low reservation utility in the second period. This is possible
because the firm can commit to pay an endogenously generated “minimum wage” next period.
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However, in case the reservation utility of the CEO is sufficiently high next period, the firm
must adjust his pay upward to retain him. This is because the CEO cannot commit to work for
the firm next period. Therefore, with an optimal contract derived without any restriction on
the contracting space, remuneration will be downward rigid and sensitive to factors that affect
the reservation wage of the manager (including luck) on the upside, so that pay-for-luck will be
asymmetric.
Moreover, we show that stock-options provide both the required downward protection and
the required upside participation, so that an optimal contract may be implemented with stock-
options. This result is all the more interesting that the standard principal-agent model of effort
choice does not explain the widespread use of stock-options in managerial compensation (Hall
and Murphy (2002), Dittmann and Maug (2007)).1 The model also predicts an increase in stock-
options based compensation as general managerial skills become relatively more important than
firm-specific skills. To the extent that this has been the case in the 1980s and the 1990s (as
argued in Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2007)), the model can explain the rise
in options-based executive compensation in this period.
Our second main result is that pay-for-luck will be stronger (relative to pay-for-performance)
in firms with a high cost of involuntary CEO turnover. Indeed, the pay of the CEO in the
second period must be state-contingent for two reasons. First, firm performance in the first
period provides some information on the CEO’s ability, which affects his reservation wage in
the second period. Second, changes in economic conditions (“luck”) also affect the reservation
wage of the CEO. But firm performance is all the more informative about managerial ability
that this ability is not precisely estimated ex-ante – think about young CEOs, or CEOs with
a short tenure, for example. It follows that state-contingent pay will put a higher weight on
firm performance (rather than luck) for CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. In addition,
if we assume that dismissing a CEO and hiring a new one is costly (Taylor (2010)), and that
this cost differs across firms, then we may expect firms with a high firing cost to hire CEOs
1This being said, postulating loss aversion (Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010)) or a larger action set for the
manager (Dittmann and Yu (2010)) improves its explanatory power.
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whose ability is more precisely estimated ex-ante. Our simple matching model of CEOs and
firms indeed yields this intuitive result. To summarize, firms with high dismissing costs will
hire CEOs whose ability is more precisely estimated ex-ante, and the contingent pay of these
CEOs will consequently involve more pay-for-luck (rather than pay for performance) than the
contingent pay of other CEOs. Thus, the model predicts that the degree of pay-for-luck relative
to pay-for-performance will tend to be higher in firms with high dismissing costs. Given that
it is efficient to dismiss CEOs with low ability in our model, a high cost of dismissal can be
interpreted as an indicator of bad corporate governance.2
Lastly, as already noted for example in Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), the skimming hypothe-
sis is hard to reconcile with the facts that, in the past decades, CEO pay increased and corporate
governance improved. Our model can contribute to explain this phenomenon – although many
other factors are probably behind the rise in CEO pay (see, e.g., Gabaix and Landier (2008)).
Indeed, we show that an improvement in corporate governance, whether across the board or
confined to the subset of badly governed firms, has a spillover effect that increases CEO pay in
all firms. The intuition is that corporate governance heterogeneity attenuates competition for
CEOs and enables well-governed firms to earn rents. Improvements in governance improve the
bargaining position of CEOs and reduce these rents.
The hypothesis at the core of our model is that retention is an important determinant of CEO
compensation. There is empirical support for this notion: Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006)
present evidence that CEO pay is structured to match the state-contingent outside employment
opportunities of managers, while Oyer and Schaefer (2005) emphasize the limitations of the
incentives-based explanation for the adoption of broad-based stock-options plans.
Pay-for-luck is not predicted by the standard moral hazard model of efficient contracting
with a risk averse agent: if a worker’s pay must be variable for incentive purposes, then the
informativeness of the performance measure should be maximized (Holmstrom (1979)), so that
2The variables used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) – the existence of a large shareholder, CEO tenure,
the board size, and the fraction of insider directors – can also be interpreted as proxies for the cost or difficulty
of CEO dismissal.
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it is optimal to filter out exogenous shocks to performance. The model of Oyer (2004) explains
pay-for-luck as the outcome of efficient contracting by invoking the retention motive and rene-
gotiation costs (see also Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), and Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for
additional references), but it does not explain the facts that pay-for-luck is asymmetric and is
associated with poor corporate governance. Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2009) and Feriozzi
(2010) propose some alternative hypotheses to explain asymmetric pay-for-luck, related respec-
tively to strategy choice and the implicit incentives emanating from the threat of bankruptcy.
Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 derives the optimal compensation contract, for any
given firm-manager match. Section 3 describes the relevant performance measure for managerial
compensation, and introduces stock-options. Section 4 describes the matching equilibrium.
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 The model
We consider a two-period economy in which firms compete for CEOs.
A firm can be run either by a “CEO” or by a “manager”. CEOs and managers are risk averse
with utility function u (·) (u′ > 0, u′′ < 0). The ability a of a CEO is normally distributed with
mean a¯ > 0 and variance σ2a. We assume a limited supply of CEOs: there are m firms and
n CEOs, with m > n. There is also an infinite supply of managers, whose expected ability
is normalized to zero.3 The reservation utility of managers is normalized at zero, and the
reservation utility of CEOs will be endogenously determined.
Firms are risk neutral and maximize their expected profits. In every period, the gross profits
(before compensation of the manager) of a firm depend on three factors: its CEO’s ability a,
business conditions L˜, and an unobservable idiosyncratic shock ˜t. We assume that ˜t is normally
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2 , and independent from other random variables for
any t ∈ {1, 2}.4 We assume that L˜ is a random variable with positive support, which is also
3The ability of managers could also be a random variable, but this would not generate additional insights.
4Assuming that both ˜t and a are normally distributed makes the Bayesian updating of beliefs on a tractable.
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independent from other random variables – we do not need to specify the distribution of L˜.
We will use the notation L˜ to denote the random variable L˜, and the notation L to denote its
realization at the end of period 1, which is observable and contractible. We will refer to L as
“luck”, since it represents a shock which is not under the control of the manager or CEO but
which nevertheless has an effect on firm value and on the CEO’s productivity (see below), such
as the price of crude oil for an oil company for instance.5 We assume that the gross profits of
the firm in period t, for t ∈ {1, 2}, are realized at the end of the period and write as:
pit = (α + sta+ ˜t)L˜ (1)
where st > 0. On the one hand, the superior average ability of CEOs relative to managers
increases expected profits. On the other hand, realized profits are informative about CEO
ability. Note that luck interacts with CEO ability. This is important: without this interaction –
with an additive structure, say – the reservation wage or “value” of a CEO would not depend on
luck. Thus, the complementarity between a and L matters, while the multiplicative structure
used in (1) is for simplicity. In practice, there are reasons to believe that the importance of
CEO ability for firm value is not independent of business conditions.
The variable st represents the accumulated experience and firm-specific skills of the CEO.
Following Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), we let st = 1 if the CEO worked for the firm in period
t − 1, and st = γ ∈ (0, 1) otherwise. This makes CEO turnover intrinsically costly. This cost
of CEO turnover is related to the relative importance of general managerial skills as opposed
to firm-specific skills in managerial jobs. For example, if general skills predominate, then s
approaches one, in which case CEOs are more easily replaceable.
For any firm, the net profits (henceforth “profits”) in any period are the gross profits net
of compensation costs. Both gross profits and net profits are observable and contractible. For
5Gabaix and Landier (2008) provide strong evidence that the dollar effect of CEO “talent” on firm value is
increasing in firm value. Therefore, an exogenous shock to firm value (L) also affects the value of CEO talent or
ability.
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simplicity, we assume a zero interest rate and no time discounting. Firms pay out their net
profits realized over period 1 and 2 to shareholders at the end of the second period. We also
assume that there is a market for each firm’s shares at the beginning of the second period,
following the realization of the luck shock L˜, where stock prices are established by competitive
and risk neutral investors. We denote by V the (endogenously determined) market value of a
given firm at the end of the first period.6
Crucially, we assume that a firm can commit to a long-term contract, but a CEO cannot.
While firms can and do propose enforceable long-term contracts to their employees, constraints
on involuntary servitude prevent employees from forgoing (ex-ante) the option to quit a job.
This one-sided-commitment assumption is natural and was introduced in Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986). We also assume that a manager can neither
save nor borrow, so that he does not transfer income from one period to another.7
Two types of contracts are feasible. Any firm can propose a spot contract to a manager
or CEO at the beginning of the first period, and a spot contract to a manager or CEO at the
beginning of the second period. In this case, the employment of the first period manager/CEO
terminates at the end of the first period. Alternatively, the firm can propose a long-term contract
to a CEO at the beginning of the first period.8 This contract specifies the wage that the firm
commits itself to pay the CEO in periods 1 and 2. It should be stressed that even a CEO who
is dismissed is entitled to this second period wage, as specified in the contract. In this case,
the wage can be interpreted as a severance payment.9 This is without loss of generality, since
we will show that both the compensation of the CEO in period 2 and the dismissal rule are
contingent on the expected ability of the CEO at the beginning of the second period and on the
6These two assumptions imply that there exists a performance measure (firm value V ) which captures both
the past performance of the manager and market conditions. In practice, there are reasons to believe that firm
value will indeed reflect these two factors.
7As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), the optimal contract is such
that the saving restriction is inconsequential.
8We show in the next section that we can ignore long-term contracts for managers, as they can be replicated
by a sequence of spot contracts.
9We show later that the expected ability of any dismissed CEO is less than zero, so that his reservation wage
is also negative. This notably implies that no firm would be willing to employ the CEO for a nonnegative wage,
and that no profitable renegotiation is possible for dismissed CEOs.
7
luck shock.
At the beginning of the second period, any CEO can resign, in which case he forgoes his
contractual second period payment, but earns his reservation wage W2, which is derived in the
next section. A firm can dismiss a CEO who has not resigned at an extra cost k, with k ≥ 0,
and hire a new CEO (or a manager) on the spot market. The parameter k represents the cost
of involuntary CEO turnover. It notably reflects some unmodeled but important factors such as
the cost of coordination problems which impede internal governance, the cost of the severance
package that an entrenched CEO may obtain, or the disruptive effect of a disorderly or lengthy
dismissal procedure.10
2 The optimal long term contract
2.1 Equilibrium on the spot market for CEOs
We first derive the updated beliefs of firms about the ability of a given CEO at the end of the
first period, after profits pi1 at his firm and the luck shock L have been observed. The updated
expected ability aˆ of a CEO is calculated using Bayes’ rule:
aˆ =
1
γ
γ2σ2a(pi1/L− (α− γa¯)) + σ2γa¯
γ2σ2a + σ
2

(2)
In the second period, a firm can choose to hire a manager with zero ability on a spot contract,
thereby making a (deterministic) profit of αL. A firm can also compete for CEOs. Consider
a CEO with expected ability aˆ. The firm that employed him in the first period is willing to
pay up to aˆL to employ him in the second period. All other firms with vacant positions are
10Taylor (2010) finds that the cost of involuntary CEO turnover consists of two components: the direct cost to
the firm, and the personal cost to the board, which includes directors’ ties to the CEO, their effort, and a lower
probability of nomination at other boards. In our model, we only consider the direct cost in terms of firm profits
for simplicity, but our results would be robust to a more general interpretation of k that includes the personal
cost to the board. Indeed, the value of the firm derived in section 3 only matters when the CEO is not dismissed
(so that k is irrelevant), and the dismissal rule derived in (6) would remain the same (the only difference is that
(5) would not be interpreted narrowly as firm profits, but as the objective function of the board, which would
then include the personal cost of dismissal).
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only willing to pay up to γaˆL to hire this CEO.11 Competition between firms drives the second
period reservation wage of a CEO with expected ability aˆ to:
W2(aˆ, L) = γaˆL. (3)
Any given CEO can earn this wage in the second period, whether he is employed under a spot
contract or a long-term contract. It follows that a firm which employed a CEO in the first period
only needs to match the compensation in (3) to retain him in the second period. For a given
L, the set of reservation wages described in (3) clears the market for CEOs at the beginning of
the second period.
In the first period, any CEO can earn a wage of W1 = γa¯E[L˜] with a spot contract.
Managers are in unlimited supply, they have zero ability and a reservation wage of zero.
Their first and second period compensation under either a spot or a long-term contract is
therefore zero.
2.2 The dismissal rule
A firm will optimally dismiss a CEO at the beginning of the second period if and only if it
increases its expected profits in the second period. On the one hand, the expected second
period profits of a firm which does not dismiss its CEO at the beginning of the second period
are
(α + aˆ)L− w2 (4)
where w2 denotes the (as yet undetermined) compensation of the CEO in the second period
under his contract. On the other hand, the expected second period profits of a firm which
dismisses its CEO at the beginning of the second period and hires either a new CEO or a
11This corresponds to the additional profits generated by a given CEO relative to a zero-ability manager.
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manager on the spot market are12
αL− k − w2 (5)
where w2 is again the second period compensation of the dismissed CEO. Comparing the ex-
pressions in (4) and (5) yields the optimal firing rule: a firm will dismiss its CEO if and only
if
aˆ < − k
L
(6)
Dismissing a CEO under a long-term contract is optimal if the expected ability of the CEO
in place is lower than a threshold. This threshold is decreasing in the cost k of changing the
CEO, which is expected, and increasing in the luck shock L. The intuition is that the ability of
the CEO matters all the more that L is high, since firms profits are multiplicative in a and L.
2.3 The optimal long-term contract
The optimal long-term contract is defined by a first period wage w?1 and a second period wage
w?2(aˆ, L), where w
?
1 and w
?
2(aˆ, L) solve the following optimization problem:
min
〈w1,w2(aˆ,L)〉
w1 + E[w2(aˆ, L)] (7)
w2(aˆ, L) ≥ W2(aˆ, L) for all aˆ, L (8)
u (w1) + E[u (w2(aˆ, L))] ≥ U¯ (9)
where U¯ denotes the (endogenously determined) reservation level of utility of the CEO over
two periods at the beginning of the first period.13 Note that U¯ will not affect the shape of the
optimal long-term contract.
The firm sets the pay of a given CEO in the first and second period to minimize the ex-
12We use the fact that the second period wage of a newly hired CEO is as in (3), whereas it is zero for a
manager.
13In a competitive equilibrium, this outside option corresponds to the highest utility offered by other firms
proposing optimal contracts.
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pected cost of compensation subject to two types of participation constraints. First, the state-
contingent participation constraints in (8) guarantee that the firm matches the reservation wage
of the CEO in the second period state-by-state (this constraint is not binding when the firm
dismisses its manager).14 Second, the constraint in (9) guarantees that the CEO accepts the
long-term contract at the beginning of the first period – which is the case if and only if the
expected utility associated with the long-term contract exceeds the reservation utility U¯ of the
CEO, (i.e., the expected utility achieved with a sequence of spot contracts, or with the long-term
contracts offered by other firms.).
The first-order conditions with respect to w1 and w2(aˆ, L) are respectively:
µu′ (w1) = 1 (10)
µu′(w2(aˆ, L)) = 1− λ(aˆ, L) for all aˆ, L (11)
where λ(aˆ,L)
Pr(aˆ,L)
and µ are respectively the (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints (8) and (9), where λ(aˆ, L) ≥ 0 satisfy the complementary slackness condition:
λ(aˆ, L)(W2(aˆ, L)− w2(aˆ, L)) = 0 for all aˆ, L (12)
where W2(aˆ, L) is as in (3). Since the second-order conditions for minimization are satisfied,
this immediately yields the form of the optimal long-term contract:
Proposition 1: Optimal contract
The optimal long-term contract is characterized by a first period wage of w∗1 and a second
period wage of
w?2(aˆ, L) = max{w∗1, γaˆL} (13)
14On the one hand, a firm dismisses its CEO if and only if aˆ < − kL . On the other hand, (8) is binding if and
only if aˆ ≥ w∗1γL , which is positive. It follows that, in cases when the firm dismisses its CEO, aˆ is negative so that
(8) cannot be binding.
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The level of the first period wage w∗1 is determined using the first period participation
constraint in (9). It notably depends on U¯ , and we assume that parameter values are such that
w∗1 is positive. A long term contract is fully determined by the first-period wage w
∗
1. The second
period wage is equal to w∗1, unless the participation constraint in (8) binds given aˆ and L, in
which case the second period wage is equal to the reservation wage W2 (aˆ, L), which is larger
than w∗1. At this stage, we do not specify how this state-contingent payment is implemented.
2.4 Interpretation
The optimal long-term contract displays three interesting features.
First, as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), the risk averse CEO is insured by the firm in the
second period: should his reservation wage fall below w∗1 in the second period, the firm will
nevertheless pay w∗1. This will be either the second period wage of the CEO, or his severance
payment in case he is dismissed at the beginning of the second period. The cost of this insurance
is a first period wage w∗1 lower than what the CEO could obtain on the spot market. That is, the
CEO pays an insurance premium in the first period to be insured against adverse realizations
of his reservation wage in the second period.15 Otherwise, if the reservation wage of the CEO
in the second period is above w∗1, the firm matches it. The CEO cannot be fully insured by the
firm (with a constant wage in the second period) because the CEO cannot commit in the first
period to work for the firm in the second period. To summarize, the optimal contract features
downside protection, with a downward rigid second period wage for insurance purposes, and
upside participation for retention purposes. The assumption of one-sided commitment is crucial
to obtain this result.
Second, the compensation of the CEO in the second period depends on business conditions,
15They stem from two sources: updating of beliefs regarding the CEO’s ability, and the luck shock. In Harris
and Holmstrom (1982), the only source of uncertainty relates to the updating of beliefs.
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or “luck” (L). The reason is the same as in Oyer (2004): compensation adjusts to the level
required to retain the CEO, and this level in turn depends on business conditions.
Third, pay for luck is asymmetric. Indeed, the pay of the CEO is sensitive to luck (at the
margin) if and only if the luck shock is sufficiently positive:
Proposition 2: Asymmetric pay for luck
For any given value of a+ ˜,
dw?2(aˆ, L)
dL
> 0 if L > L and
dw?2(aˆ, L)
dL
= 0 if L < L (14)
where L ≡ 1
b
(
w∗1 − κ−
σ2a
σ2 + σ
2
a
(a+ ˜)
)
This result highlights that, with an optimal contract, CEOs are “rewarded for good luck”,
but they are not symmetrically “penalized for bad luck”: pay-for-luck is asymmetric. This is
due to the insurance against adverse states of the world (including bad luck) provided by the
optimal contract to risk averse CEOs.
As long as the expected termination costs are not too large, a long-term contract dominates
a sequence of spot contracts. This is because a long-term contract allows to partly insure the
CEO in the second period. In the remainder of the paper, we assume that this is the case.16
3 Implementation with stock-options
In equilibrium, the second period compensation of a CEO depends on his expected ability aˆ
and on the luck shock L. In this section, we show that the optimal long-term contract can be
implemented by giving stock-options to the CEO. We also discuss how the optimal compensation
16This assumption can be microfounded by assuming that σ2a and k are sufficiently low.
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contract depends on the model parameters.
We first show that the optimal second-period compensation of the CEO can be expressed
as a function of firm value at the beginning of the second period and the luck shock. To this
end, we first derive firm value, V . In a competitive market for firm shares with risk neutral
shareholders, firm value at the beginning of the second period is:
V = pi1 − w1 + E[pi2|pi1, L]− w2(aˆ, L) = pi1 − w∗1 + (α + aˆ)L−max{w∗1, γaˆL} (15)
if aˆ > − k
L
. Otherwise, the incumbent CEO is dismissed at the beginning of the second period,
with a compensating payment of w∗1, while the new CEO receives a fixed wage, so that firm
value does not matter for compensation purposes. Recall that
aˆ =
1
γ
γ2σ2a(pi1/L− (α− γa¯)) + σ2γa¯
γ2σ2a + σ
2

.
Substituting pi1 = V + w
∗
1 − (α + aˆ)L+ max{w∗1, γaˆL}, and isolating aˆ, we get that:
w?2(aˆ, L) = w
∗
1 if γaˆL ≤ w∗1
w?2(aˆ, L) = γaˆL =
(
γ2σ2a + σ
2

γ2σ2a
+
1− γ
γ
)−1 (
V + w∗1 − 2αL+ γa¯L
(
σ2
γ2σ2a
− 1
))
otherwise
We thus get:
w?2(aˆ, L) = max{w∗1, ψ(w∗1 + V + ηL)} (16)
where ψ ≡
(
γ2σ2a + σ
2

γ2σ2a
+
1− γ
γ
)−1
and η ≡ γa¯
(
σ2
γ2σ2a
− 1
)
− 2α (17)
Notice that ψ < 1.
We now specify how the optimal contract described in (13) and (16) can be implemented
with stock-options on a measure which is constructed to incorporate both changes in firm value
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and luck. Consider the measure P (V, L), constructed as
P (V, L) = V + ηL (18)
Then the state-contingent payment w?2(aˆ, L) in (13) can be implemented by making payments
to the agent contingent on the measure P :
w?2(aˆ, L) = max{w∗1, ψw∗1 + ψP (V, L)} (19)
This immediately leads us to this important result:
Proposition 3: Optimal contract and stock options
The state-contingent optimal payment in (19) may be implemented by giving the CEO a
fixed wage w∗1 and ψ stock-options on P with exercise price κ =
w∗1(1−ψ)
ψ
, which vest and expire
at the beginning of the second period, after the firm has decided whether to retain or to dismiss
its CEO.
This notably implies that the options of a dismissed CEO are out-of-the-money and therefore
worthless. Three important comparative static results follow:
Corollary: Under the optimal contract, d
dL
P (V, L) 6= 0, dη
dγ
< 0, and dψ
dγ
> 0.
First, the stock-options are not completely indexed: the luck shock L is not fully filtered out
of the measure P . Intuitively, this is because the reservation wage of the CEO in the second
period depends on L.17 Furthermore, the degree of pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance
(or pay-for-ability), which is measured by η, is increasing in σ2 , and decreasing in σ
2
a: there
17More precisely, firm value net of luck, which may be viewed as a measure of “pure performance”, matters
for the reservation wage insofar as it leads to updating on the manager’s ability. Likewise, luck matters for the
reservation wage insofar as the latter is sensitive to “economic conditions”.
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will be more pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance when firm value V is a noisy measure
of CEO ability a, and when the initial uncertainty on the ability of the executive is low. This
suggests that pay-for-luck will be relatively strong for non-CEOs (whose σ2 is high), as well as
for old CEOs or CEOs with a long tenure (whose σ2a is low). On the contrary, young CEOs or
CEOs with a short tenure should be less paid for luck, all else equal. In the limit, as the ratio
σ2
σ2a
tends to infinity, η also tends to infinity, and state-contingent remuneration only depends on
luck. Note that η can be positive, in which case the measure P contains more luck than firm
value V .
Second, the degree of pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance is decreasing in γ, which
measures the relative importance of general managerial skills as opposed to firm-specific skills.
As γ approaches zero, there is only pay-for-luck and no pay-for-performance. Indeed, if only firm-
specific skills matter, then the CEO’s ability is irrelevant for other firms, so that his reservation
wage does not depend on his ability, but only on luck. On the contrary, our model predicts that
a rise in the importance of general managerial skills (as proxied by γ) should be accompanied
by a reduction in pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance.
Third, the quantity ψ of stock-options given to the CEO is an increasing function of γ. To
the extent that general skills did indeed become progressively more important in the 1980s and
the 1990s, as argued by Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2007), then our model can
explain why CEOs received increasing amounts of stock-options over this period (Frydman and
Jenter (2010), figure 2).
It is noteworthy that the CEO is not more exposed to risk with this long-term contract
than he would be with a spot contract – he is even less exposed to risk with the long-term
contract because of the embedded insurance. Indeed, the CEO is only exposed to variations
in his reservation wage – on the upside. Firm value V consists in two components: some
exogenous shocks which can be filtered out (here represented by L), and the “pure measure of
performance”, i.e., firm profits once exogenous influences (such as L) have been removed. Since
the beliefs on the CEO’s ability are updated based on this “pure measure of performance”, any
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residual noise in this measure will also affect the updated beliefs on the CEO’s ability, and
therefore his reservation wage.18
Finally, it should be noted that the firm could simply commit to paying the manager the
fixed wage w∗1 in periods 1 and 2, and adjust his pay at the beginning of the second period
depending on aˆ and L. While this is certainly possible, this would not be optimal if we were
to assume that there exists a renegotiation or transaction cost, no matter how small. Even
with an arbitrarily small renegotiation cost, the long-term contract described in this section
would strictly dominate the contract described above in this paragraph. By contrast, in Oyer
(2004), with an arbitrarily small renegotiation cost, it will almost always19 be optimal to use
spot contracts instead of long-term contracts.20
4 Matching equilibrium
The literature on pay-for-luck has documented a negative correlation between pay-for-luck and
measures of corporate governance. This empirical fact is at the root of the skimming theory,
which states that CEOs “set their own pay” in badly governed firms (Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001)). To incorporate this important dimension in our model, we develop a model of matching
between CEOs and firms.
18Here our results differ from Oyer’s (2004). In Oyer, the tradeoff is between exposing the CEO to risk
(by indexing his pay on some variable which is imperfectly correlated with his reservation wage) and incurring
renegotiation or transactions costs with interim re-contracting. We also differ from standard models of moral
hazard, where the optimal contract is the outcome of a tradeoff between exposing the agent to a noisy measure
of his effort and providing incentives for effort.
19As long as the degree of risk aversion and the variance of the performance measure are strictly positive.
20This is not the only potential reason why it is preferable to use an explicit contract rather than an ex-post
adjustment to relate the compensation of the CEO pay in the second period to firm value at the end of the
first period. For example, suppose that the CEO can invest (at a cost) in firm-specific skills at the beginning
of the first period. There will then typically be a time-inconsistency problem: ex-ante, the firm would like to
commit to pay the CEO more for increases in firm value, so that the CEO invests efficiently in firm-specific
skills. However, ex-post, since investment in firm-specific skills does not increase the reservation wage of the
CEO, it is in the interests of the firm to renege on this promise. In this perspective, an explicit contract may be
used as a commitment device.
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4.1 A matching model of CEOs and firms
On the one hand, we assume that firms differ along one dimension: the cost k of CEO dismissal.
This cost can be viewed as a measure of (bad) governance. In general, corporate governance
measures the extent to which the firm is managed in the interests of the providers of funds. In
our model, the only relevant differences across firms are the estimated ability of the CEO at
the beginning of the second period and the cost of CEO dismissal. In addition, all CEOs have
the same expected ability ex-ante. Therefore, in our model, corporate governance measures the
extent to which a firm can dismiss a CEO with low estimated ability at the beginning of the
second period and hire a more able CEO or manager instead. This is captured by the cost k.
Accordingly, we will henceforth refer interchangeably to the cost of dismissal or to governance,
bearing in mind that we consider corporate governance only insofar as it matters for involuntary
CEO turnover.21
On the other hand, we assume that different managers have different σ2a, so that managers
can be ranked according to the variance of their ability. That is, managers’ ability is more or
less precisely estimated ex-ante.22 There are no information asymmetries: for each manager,
the value of σ2a is common knowledge, but neither the firms nor the manager observe a.
This corresponds to a matching model with nontransferabilities, as studied in Legros and
Newman (2007).23 An equilibrium is defined by a matching function indicating which type of
firm employs which type of manager in equilibrium, and equilibrium long-term contracts. The
first condition for equilibrium is that the matching function be consistent, i.e., each manager
is matched with only one firm. The second condition is that no firm can break its match and
improve its expected profit by proposing a contract to an already matched manager that would
prefer that contract. Legros and Newman (2007) derive sufficient conditions on the Pareto fron-
tiers generated by a match that ensure positive or negative assortative matching. In our setup,
21The assumption that a better corporate governance results in a lower cost of CEO dismissal is also in
Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin (2011).
22We do not need to be more specific about the distribution of σ2a across managers.
23Other matching models between managers and firms in the CEO compensation literature include Gabaix
and Landier (2008), and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009).
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the equilibrium is characterized by negative assortative matching:
Proposition 4: Negative assortative matching
First, the m−n firms with the highest k are matched with managers. Second, given any two
firms not matched with a manager and any two CEOs, the firm with the lowest k is matched
with the CEO with the highest σ2a, while the firm with the highest k is matched with the CEO
with the lowest σ2a.
A firm which can dismiss its CEO at a lower cost will be matched with a relatively more
“risky” CEO. Intuitively, it is more likely that the estimated ability of a risky CEO (with a high
σ2a) will fall below the firing threshold of any firm (which is necessarily negative). To minimize
the costs of dismissals and the costs of inefficient continuation of CEOs with low ability, it is
more efficient to match a risky CEO with a firm with a low k, i.e., a good corporate governance,
according to our interpretation.24
Heterogeneity among firms and CEOs and the resulting matching equilibrium that we de-
scribed has important implications, that we describe in the next two subsections.
4.2 Pay-for-luck and governance
First of all, our matching model can explain the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) finding that
firms with bad corporate governance use contracts that display more pay for luck – note that
the measures of governance used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (see footnote 2) can also be
viewed as measures of the cost of CEO dismissal. Indeed, in a matching equilibrium, firms with
different costs of CEO dismissal (or governance) are matched with CEOs whose ability is more
precisely estimated, and conversely. This means that firms with different types of governance
design optimal long-term contracts for different types of CEOs. Consequently, it is in principle
24The first part of Proposition 4 is not of great interest, since it is driven by the assumption that the variance
of the ability of managers is zero.
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possible that the observed differences in CEO pay across firms with different types of governance
are explained by differences in CEO characteristics.
To take an extreme example, suppose that some CEOs have a known ability (σ2a = 0).
Since aˆ = a¯ with probability one, only future business conditions, or “luck” (L), make the
second period reservation wage of these CEOs stochastic. On the contrary, the reservation
wage of CEOs with an unknown ability (σ2a > 0) is stochastic for two reasons: future business
conditions, and the updating of beliefs regarding their ability following their performance in the
first period. We know from Proposition 4 that CEOs with a known ability will be matched to
firms with high costs of dismissal (or bad governance), while CEOs with unknown ability will
be matched to firms with low costs of dismissal (or better governance). In the former case, all
the variability in the second period pay of the CEO will be attributable to luck. In the latter
case, it will be attributable both to luck and to the updating of beliefs on the CEO’s ability.
That is, in firms with high costs of dismissal, CEOs will be exclusively paid for luck, but they
will not be paid for performance (since firm performance is not informative about the CEO’s
ability, it is pure noise and will be filtered out of the contract). On the contrary, in firms with
low costs of dismissal, CEOs will be paid for luck and for performance.
In a more general case where the ability of different managers is estimated with a different
precision, our model relates the degree of pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance of a given
CEO to the variance of his ability:
Proposition 5:
dw?2(aˆ,L)
dL
dw?2(aˆ,L)
dV
is (weakly) decreasing in σ2a (20)
In turn, since CEOs with a high variance of ability are matched to firms with a high cost of
dismissal, the model predicts that there is more pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance in
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firms with a higher cost of dismissal (or worse governance):
Corollary: Pay-for-luck and governance
dw?2(aˆ,L)
dL
dw?2(aˆ,L)
dV
is (weakly) increasing in k (21)
The higher the cost of CEO dismissal, the more a firm pays its CEO for luck rather than
for performance.
In summary, we have shown that firms with high costs of CEO dismissal will be matched
with CEOs with a relatively low σ2a: these firms optimally select CEOs with a low variance
of ability (“safe CEOs”). In addition, we know from the previous section that the degree of
pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance is decreasing in σ2a. The model therefore predicts
that pay-for-luck will be relatively stronger in firms with higher costs of CEO dismissal, i.e., a
worse governance on this dimension.
4.3 Corporate governance spillovers
The matching model that we propose also generates corporate governance spillovers, whereby
an improvement in governance in a subset of firms has spillover effects that increase CEO com-
pensation in firms with a better governance. We denote the cost of CEO dismissal in a given
firm i by ki, with k1 < k2 < . . . < km < . . . < kn.
Proposition 6: Corporate governance spillovers
If ki diminishes for the set of firms {kj, . . . , kJ}, with kj ≤ kJ and kj ≤ km without changing
the ranking of firms on this dimension, then CEO compensation increases in the set of firms
with cost of dismissal {k1, . . . ,min{kJ−1, km}}.
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In equilibrium, the expected profits of any given firm are constrained by the competition for
CEOs. More precisely, the difference in expected profits between any given firm which employs
a CEO and the next firm with a higher cost of CEO dismissal is increasing in the wedge in the
cost of CEO dismissal between these two firms. Lower costs of CEO dismissal in a subset of
firms reduce this wedge and therefore reduce expected profits in this subset of firms (except for
the one with the highest cost of CEO dismissal, and except for firms which employ managers),
and increase the compensation of their CEOs. It follows that these firms will be willing to bid
higher to hire CEOs employed by firms with lower costs of CEO dismissals. In equilibrium, CEO
pay must therefore increase in all firms with a better governance. In particular, an improvement
in the quality of governance of badly governed firms (for example because of the widespread
adoption of best practices) triggers an across the board increase in CEO pay.
Our model can explain the fact that CEO pay rose as corporate governance improved (Holm-
strom and Kaplan (2003), Murphy and Zabojnik (2004)). This fact cannot be explained by the
skimming hypothesis, which would predict the opposite.
5 Other predictions and empirical implications
In this section, we confront the predictions of our model to further empirical evidence.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that “governance correlates very little with pay for
performance, only with pay for luck.”25 This is also predicted by our model. Indeed, the
sensitivity of pay for performance to σ2a is zero, while the sensitivity of pay for luck to σ
2
a is
proportional to the sensitivity of η to σ2a, which is strictly negative. That is, the model does
not predict any cross-sectional variation in pay-for-performance across firm-CEO matches. In
addition, the model predicts that firms with better governance tend to be matched with CEOs
25As discussed in section 4, governance in our model is related to the cost of CEO dismissal, and the measures
of governance used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) can also be viewed as measures of the cost of CEO
dismissal.
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whose ability is more uncertain (i.e., with a high σ2a), and therefore tend to have relatively less
pay-for-luck.
Even though we do not explicitly derive predictions on this dimension in our simple two-
periods model, there are reasons to believe that σ2a will decrease over the tenure of a CEO, as his
ability becomes more accurately measured. An implicit prediction of our model is therefore that
pay-for-luck should increase with CEO tenure. This is all the more interesting that Bertrand
and Mullainathan derive a similar prediction with the skimming model: their hypothesis is that
CEOs with a longer tenure are more entrenched, so that they can extract more monetary benefits
in the form of asymmetric pay-for-luck. In addition, the variance of CEO ability is not related
to pay-for-performance in our model, so that we expect no relationship between tenure and pay-
for-performance. As is made clear in Bertrand and Mullainathan, the data suggest that there
is indeed a positive relationship between tenure and pay-for-luck, but no relationship between
tenure and pay-for-performance.26 These two predictions, which are empirically validated, are
common to the skimming hypothesis and the efficient contracting model.
This being said, Bertrand and Mullainathan also find that the positive relationship between
tenure and pay-for-luck holds only for firms without a large shareholder on the board (with a
large shareholder on the board, the relationship is not statistically significant). The skimming
hypothesis can explain this, whereas our model of efficient contracting cannot.27
The model does not generate any prediction regarding the frequency of firm-CEO separations
depending on a measure of corporate governance. On the one hand, firms with bad corporate
governance will tend to hire CEOs with a more precisely estimated ability, which tends to reduce
26Garvey and Milbourn (2003) also find that relative performance evaluation, which consists in filtering out
one type of exogenous shock, namely the market index, is stronger for younger CEOs. They interpret this finding
as evidence that firms tend to let older (and more wealthy) CEOs hedge against market fluctuations themselves,
since they are better able to do so than young CEOs.
27Obviously, this does not mean that no model of efficient contracting can explain this feature of the data.
For example, the model of CEO discretion of Gromb, Burkart and Panunzi (1997) predicts that a CEO who
is less monitored by shareholders (which will typically be the case with a large shareholder on the board) will
take more initiatives. On the contrary, a CEO who is closely monitored by shareholders will tend to manage the
firm more conservatively. All else equal, this suggests that the updating on CEO ability will tend to be much
faster in the former case: the model would thus predict a stronger (positive) relationship between tenure and
pay-for-luck for firms with a large shareholder on the board.
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bad surprises and the associated forced turnover. On the other hand, CEOs whose ability
are more precisely estimated may be older, and therefore closer to retirement, which tends to
increase voluntary turnover. A priori, it is not clear which effect will dominate.28 In addition,
the model predicts that forced turnovers will follow a downward revision of shareholders’ beliefs
about CEO ability, but they will be unrelated to luck. In line with this latter prediction, Garvey
and Milbourn (2006) do not find any statistically significant relationship between CEO turnover
and luck.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a principal-agent model of efficient contracting which explains the main
empirical regularities associated with the pay-for-luck phenomenon – notably asymmetric pay-
for-luck and the association between pay-for-luck and bad corporate governance. Our analysis
builds on Oyer (2004) and stresses the importance of the retention motive for CEO compensa-
tion. First, asymmetric pay-for-luck is due to the insurance against a deterioration of business
conditions given by the firm to a risk-averse CEO. Second, when the cost of CEO dismissal
varies across firms and the ability of different CEOs is more or less precisely estimated ex-ante,
we show that the equilibrium matching between CEOs and firms is such that pay-for-luck is
relatively more important in firms with a high cost of CEO dismissal, which can be interpreted
as an indicator of bad governance. The model can also explain the use of stock-options in man-
agerial compensation. Its predictions on a variety of dimensions are broadly consistent with the
existing empirical evidence, but future work could specifically test some new hypotheses. In
particular, we predict that an improvement in the governance of badly governed firms will have
spillover effects that increase CEO pay in all firms. Our results contribute to a large recent
literature which shows that the efficient contracting paradigm can actually explain a number of
apparent anomalies (Edmans and Gabaix (2009)).
28Kaplan and Minton (2011) find no statistically significant relationship between CEO turnover and corporate
governance.
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We do not claim that our model integrates all the factors which are relevant for CEO com-
pensation. In particular, we ignored the incentives aspect of the problem. This said, the ability
of the model to explain many important stylized facts suggests that the often overlooked re-
tention motive might be an important determinant of the structure (not just the level) of CEO
compensation. Given that matching models can explain important features of CEO compensa-
tion, future work could build on this and other contributions (e.g., Gabaix and Landier (2008))
to develop a unified model of CEO pay which jointly explains the level and the structure of
CEO compensation. This would enable us to better understand how competition and retention
interplay to influence optimal compensation schemes.
7 References
Acharya Viral, Marc Gabarro, and Paolo Volpin, “Competition for managers, corporate
governance and incentive compensation,” working paper.
Bebchuk Lucian and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Compensation, Harvard University Press, Nov. 2004.
Bertand Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The
Ones without Principals Are,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, Issue 3 (August 2001),
901-929.
Dittmann Ingolf and Ernst Maug, “Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal
Structure of Executive Pay,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, Issue 1 (February 2007), 303–343.
Dittmann Ingolf, Ernst Maug and Oliver Spalt, “Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO
compensation when managers are loss-averse”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 65, (2010), 2015-2050.
Dittmann Ingolf and Ko-Chia Yu, “How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Ex-
ecutive Compensation?”, mimeo 2010, Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam.
Edmans Alex and Xavier Gabaix, “Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New
Optimal Contract Theories,” European Financial Management, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2009), 486-496.
25
Edmans Alex and Xavier Gabaix, “The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market,” (2010),
forthcoming, Review of Financial Studies.
Edmans Alex and Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, “A Multiplicative Model of
Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, 2009,
4881-4917.
Feriozzi Fabio, “Paying for Observable Luck”, RAND Journal of Economics, 42 (2), 2011,
387415.
Frydman Carola , “Rising through the ranks: the evolution of the market for corporate
executives, 1936-2003,” working paper, MIT, 2007.
Frydman Carola and Dirk Jenter, “CEO Compensation,” Annual Review of Financial
Economics, Vol. 2, December 2010.
Gabaix Xavier and Augustin Landier, “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 123(1), (2008), p. 49-100.
Garvey Gerald and Todd Milbourn, “Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation:
Executives are Rewarded for Good Luck but not Penalized for Bad”, Journal of Financial
Economics 82 (2006) 197–225.
Garvey Gerald and Todd Milbourn, “Incentive Compensation When Executives Can
Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section”, Journal
of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 4 (August 2003).
Gopalan Radha, Todd Milbourn and Fenghua Song, “Strategic Flexibility and the
Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance”, Review of Financial Studies, 23, (2010), 2060-2098.
Gromb Denis, Mike Burkart and Fausto Panunzi, “Large Shareholders, Monitoring,
and the Value of the Firm,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, (1997), 693-728.
Hall Brian and Kevin Murphy, “Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, ”Journal
of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2002, 3-42.
Harris Milton and Bengt Holmstrom, “A Theory of Wage Dynamics,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 49, No. 3 (July 1982). 315-333.
26
Holmstrom Bengt, “Moral Hazard and Observability”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.
10, No. 1, (Spring, 1979), 74-91.
Holmstrom Bengt and Steven N. Kaplan, “The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:
What’s Right and What’s Wrong?”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 15, no. 3
(Spring 2003), 8-20.
Himmelberg Charles and Glen Hubbard, “Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs:
An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity,” Working Paper, Columbia University, March
2000.
Kaplan Steven and Bernadette Minton, “How has CEO Turnover Changed? ” Inter-
national Review of Finance (2011), forthcoming.
Legros Patrick and Andrew Newman, “Beauty is a Beast and Frog is a Prince: Assorta-
tive Matching with Nontransferabilities,” Econometrica, Vol. 75, No 4, (July 2007), 1073-1102.
Morse Adair, Vikram Nanda, and Amit Seru, “Are Incentive Contracts Rigged By
Powerful CEOs?,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Oyer Paul, “Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentives Effects?,” Journal of
Finance, Vol. 59, No. 4, (August 2004), 1619-1649.
Oyer Paul and Scott Schaefer, “Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?:
An empirical examination of alternative theories,” Journal of Financial Economics, 76 (2005),
99-133.
Shivaram Rajgopal, Terry Shevlin and Valentian Zamora, “CEOs’ Outside Em-
ployment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation
Contracts,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, Vol. 4 (August 2006), 1813-44.
Taylor Lucian, “Why are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation,”
Journal of Finance, Vol. 65, No.6 (December 2010), 2051-2087.
Thomas Jonathan and Tim Worrall, “Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), 541-553.
27
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
According to (13), dw2
dL
> 0 if and only if W2(aˆ, L) > w
∗
1. According to (16), this is the case
if and only if
κ+ nV + (1− n)bL > w∗1
Or
L >
1
b
(
w∗1 − κ−
σ2a
σ2 + σ
2
a
(a+ ˜)
)
≡ L
If this condition is not satisfied, then w2 = w
∗
1, and
dw2
dL
= 0.
Proof of the Corollary of Proposition 3:
Comparing (19) and (13), we get, for γaˆL ≥ w∗1
γaˆL = nw∗1 + nP (V, L) (22)
So that
d
dL
{
γaˆL
}
= n
d
dL
P (V, L) (23)
Stock-options are fully indexed if and only if d
dL
P (V, L) = 0. But this cannot be the case since
the left-hand-side of (23) is different from zero, except on a set of measure zero (for aˆ = 0).
The other two comparative static results follow immediately from (17).
Proof of Proposition 4:
We will use the condition in proposition1-ii in Legros and Newman (2007) to prove that the
matching will satisfy Negative Assortative Matching (NAM), that is firms with better corporate
governance match with riskier CEOs.
For that consider two firms with firing costs k > k
′
and two CEOs indexed by risk σ2 < σ
′2.
28
Consider the long term contracts offered by the firm with high costs of firing to both types
of CEOs that lead to the same profit for the firm. To prove NAM, we just need to show that if
the firm with low firing cost proposes long term optimal contracts to the CEOs that give them
as much as the contracts proposed by the high cost firm, it would make larger profits when it
proposes a contract to the risky CEO.
First, note that the expected utility of a CEO for a given long term contract depends only
on w1. This means that the low cost firm would propose the same long term contract as the
high cost firm if it needs to ensure the same expected utility to the CEO.
The CEO is fired if the estimated ability of the current CEO is too low compared to the
average ability of a new CEO. The dismissal condition is: aˆ ≤ −k/L = ak (L) .
The extra profit of a firm with low dismissal costs that proposes the same contract as a
firm with bad corporate governance is thus for a given L : Φσ (−k/L)
(
k − k′
)
. When σ2 < σ
′2,
we have that Φσ
(
ak (L)
)
> Φσ′
(
ak (L)
)
for a < a¯. Given that ak (L) < a¯, we have that
Φσa
(
ak (L)
) (
k − k′
)
increases as σ2 increases. Integrating over L, we get the result of negative
assortative matching .
Proof of Proposition 5:
Either W2 < w
∗
1, in which case
dw2
dL
= 0 and dw2
dV
= 0, so that
dw2
dL
dw2
dV
is independent of σ2a. Or
W2 ≥ w∗1, in which case dw2dL = n(σ
2

σ2a
+ 1) and dw2
dV
= n, so that
dw2
dL
dw2
dV
=
(
σ2
σ2a
+ 1
)
− 1, which is
positive and decreasing in σ2a.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Suppose that the ranking of costs of dismissals at different firms is such that k1 < k2 <
. . . < km < . . . < kn. Below, we identify each firm by its cost of dismissal. Likewise, suppose
that the ranking of CEOs is such that σ1 > σ2 > . . . > σm, where the index a was dropped for
readability. Below, we identify each CEO by the variance of his ability. Consider two firms with
costs of dismissal ki and ki+1, for i ∈ {1,m}.
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The structure of CEO compensation {w?1}i=1,...,n must be such that, for any i ∈ {1,m}:
(i) The CEO i, who is matched with firm ki (because of negative assortative matching)
with a wage w?1(ki, σi), cannot get a strictly better offer at another firm: w
?
1(ki, σi) ≥ w1(kj, σi)
for any j 6= i, where w1(kj, σi) is the wage paid to CEO σi that would give firm kj the same
level of expected profits than under negative assortative matching and the structure of wages
{w?1}i=1,...,n.
(ii) Firm ki cannot decrease w
?
1(ki, σi) without violating (i).
First, we know from Proposition 4 that all firms ki, for i ≥ m+ 1, hire managers and make
zero profits.
Second, the wage w1(ki, σj) paid to a given CEO σj by firm ki that leaves expected profits
unchanged (see point (i) above) is strictly decreasing in ki, for all firms ki ≤ km.
Third, we know from Proposition 4 that firm km+1 hires a manager and therefore makes
zero profits in each period, while firm km hires the CEO σm. By construction, w1(km+1, σm) is
such that firm km+1 is indifferent between hiring a manager or hiring the CEO σm at a wage
w1(km+1, σm). We know from the second point above that, given all firms ki, for i ≥ m + 1,
w1(ki, σm) is highest for firm m+ 1. Therefore, if we only consider the set of firms {km, . . . , kn},
condition (i) and (ii) are satisfied if and only if w?1(km, σm) = w1(km+1, σm). In particular,
since the firm km+1 makes zero profits with CEO σm at wage w1(km+1, σm) (by construction
of w1(km+1, σm)), and because of the second point above, we know that firm m makes strictly
positive profits.
Fourth, suppose that w?1(ki, σi) = w1(ki+1, σi) is satisfied for all i ∈ {j, . . . , n}, for some
j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, given conditions (i) and (ii). We will show that it is then also satisfied for j−1.
As above, given the set of firms {km+1, . . . , kn}, w1(kj, σj−1) is highest for firm kj. Therefore,
as above, if we only consider the set of firms and CEOs i ∈ {j − 1, . . . , n}, condition (i) and
(ii) are satisfied if and only if w?1(kj−1, σj−1) = w1(kj, σj−1). Repeating this algorithm, it can be
30
shown by induction that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
w?1(ki, σi) = w1(ki+1, σi) (24)
Now suppose that ki diminishes for the set of firms {kj, . . . , kJ}, with kj ≤ kJ and kj ≤ km,
in such a way that the ranking of firms with respect to dismissal costs is unchanged. Since
w1(ki+1, σi) is strictly decreasing in ki+1, it follows that w1(ki+1, σi) strictly increases for all
i ∈ {j−1, . . . ,min{J−1,m}}, so that CEO pay in firm ki, w?1(ki, σi), strictly increases because
of (24), for all i ∈ {j − 1, . . . ,min{J − 1,m}}
But if w?1(kj−1, σj−1) strictly increases, this strictly decreases the expected profits at firm j−1,
so that w1(kj−1, σj−2) strictly increases as well, by construction. Applying again (24) to i = j−2
shows that w?1(kj−2, σj−2) strictly increases. Repeating this algorithm for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1},
it can be shown by induction that w?1(ki, σi) strictly increases for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,min{J−1,m}}.
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